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Howie’s Between Feminism and Materialism and the Critical History of Religions 
 
 
There are few benefits to the UK REF exercise and particularly few to the system of 
internally reviewing outputs now developing in UK universities, but having the opportunity to 
read the work of colleagues is at least one silver lining. It was such an exercise that provoked 
the last, cherished philosophical conversation I had with Gillian Howie on the various guises 
of abstraction in the history of philosophy – as insult, epistemic virtue or amphibolous 
operation. A future research project on abstraction crossed both our minds. The following 
cannot easily be read as a prolegomenon to such a project, a thank you or even a way of 
doing justice to Gill’s legacy. But in spirit at least, it is indeed meant as an act of 
remembrance. 
 
 
Introduction: Which Critique? 
Critique can destroy, ground or delimit; it can attack from without or undermine from within; 
it can open up new vistas, sciences and truths or close them down just as quickly. The history 
of philosophy itself consists in part in a proliferating series of critiques. To think 
philosophically is often to experience the vertigo of critique.  
Contemporary philosophy of religion has a sometimes charmed but often frustrating 
relation to the critical enterprise. Born from, and indelibly marked by, the Enlightenment 
critique of religion, which often took the form of a hostile, external attack on the value and 
even actuality of religious phenomena
1
, philosophy of religion has also been quick to shield 
its subject matter (and thereby prolong its own existence – as dependent on this subject 
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matter) by appropriating the twentieth-century critique of the Enlightenment. It uneasily 
critiques that critique on which it is grounded, and out of such a convoluted dialectic emerges 
a key question for philosophy of religion: in what way is it and should it be critical?
2
 The 
problem is even more acute with respect to two marginal forms within the contemporary 
practice of philosophy of religion: feminist philosophy of religion and Marxist philosophy of 
religion. From a feminist standpoint, there is much that is pernicious in religious traditions of 
all varieties. Similarly, of course, for Marxists: ‘The criticism of religion is the premise of all 
criticism.’ (Marx 1977 131) The feminist and Marxist critiques of religion are thus direct 
heirs to the Enlightenment distrust of the religious. And yet, both feminism and Marxist 
critical theory have been among the disciplines most receptive to the more recent and 
prevalent suspicion of Enlightenment values. The convolution in philosophy of religion’s 
relation to critique is performed most distinctly in these fields by means of a continual 
oscillation between critique and the critique of critique. 
 It is into this context that I propose to insert Gillian Howie’s ‘recovery of 
emancipatory critique’ (2010 3) in her late work. It must be emphasised from the outset that 
Howie has little to say directly about religion (with the exception of Women and the Divine 
(2009)), and my attempt here to appropriate Between Feminism and Materialism for 
philosophy of religion may well have met with a wry smile or even a critical ‘shudder’ (2008 
103). Nevertheless, Howie’s work is pertinent precisely because it is so much more attentive 
than most to the convolutions outlined above in both feminism and Marxism generally. For 
example, here is her articulation of this ‘paradox at the heart of feminism’: 
 
Feminism is fundamentally an Enlightenment or modernist project; it concerns the 
emancipation of morally valuable individual subjects. Yet recent feminist theory rails 
against the principal tenets of Enlightenment thought: reason, autonomy, identity, 
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universals, science and – in the end – freedom itself. As a consequence, unable to 
articulate common grounds of oppression, the rug seems whipped from under our feet 
– leaving feminism struggling to articulate its relevance and purpose. (2010 12) 
 
Howie, then, is both aware of and sympathetic to the critique of the Enlightenment categories 
of reason, universality and identity, but simultaneously wishes to rescue these categories (no 
matter how partially) in order to retain feminism’s critical edge: to critique the critique of 
critique, as it were. Hence, she brackets ‘Nietzsche, Bergson, Freud and Foucault’ (2010 7) in 
favour of ‘a refreshed and revised engagement with Marxism’ (2010 26). This involves using 
dialectical materialism to illuminate the practical, economic and socially-specific bases of 
concept-use so as to distinguish a theoretically-productive form of reason or universality from 
those forms that are patriarchally pernicious. The task is, as Howie puts it, ‘to disaggregate 
objectivism from objectivity’ (2010 37); or more fully, 
 
The task before us then is to locate a critique of ideology within Enlightenment, 
rather than totalising a historical critique of ideology. More particularly, the task is to 
demarcate the specificity of a cognitive orientation that works through abstraction, 
quantification and substitutability as a feature of commodity production rather than as 
a general anthropological principle. (2010 85) 
 
‘Specificity’ is here key: if the critique of Enlightenment critique is contextualised to a local 
domain, then this opens up other domains in which a reinvigorated form of critique becomes 
legitimate. Critique (as contextualisation) is here deployed to rescue a form of 
(Enlightenment) critique from (anti-Enlightenment) critical attack. 
My task in what follows is to translate this approach into the terms of philosophy of 
religion and test its viability in this domain. In particular, my concern is with the fate of the 
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concept of abstraction in Howie’s work (and in Marxist theory generally), for it is out of 
theoretical discussions of abstraction, I contend, that a modality of critique specific to, and 
productive within, philosophy of religion emerges.
3
 That is, the emergence of a critical 
philosophy of religion is premised on the identification of religions as ‘real abstractions’, and 
therefore on the consequent materialist attitude appropriate to such an act of identification. 
 
 
The Attack on Abstraction in Howie’s Early Work 
As a way-in to the problematic of abstraction as it crosses Marxism, feminism and 
philosophy of religion, in the initial two sections of this essay I wish to trace the development 
of Howie’s theory of abstraction through her output. And to put it bluntly, prior to Between 
Feminism and Materialism, Howie’s attitude to this concept is hostile. 
 The paradigmatic example of Howie’s early attack on abstractions is to be found in 
her critique of the significance of Deleuzian ‘becoming-woman’ for feminist theory. 
According to Howie, becoming-woman has so little value because it forever remains a 
generalised, disembodied category, removed from the concrete particularities of female lived 
experience. It is, in short, abstract – where ‘abstraction’ here functions as an insult. Howie 
writes, 
 
The idea of ‘becoming-woman’ is an attempt to transform embodied experience but, 
because it is unable to concern itself with mechanisms, structures and processes of 
sexual differentiations, fails in this task… Working in the abstract, ‘becoming-
woman’ stands with ‘becoming-animal’ and ‘becoming-imperceptible’ as a form of 
minoritarian becoming. But there seems little to say about the peculiarities of 
becoming-woman rather than, say, becoming-insect. (2008 83-4) 
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She continues, turning particularly to the grounding of Deleuze and Guattari’s invocation of 
becoming-woman on the conceptual motif of the body-without-organs, 
 
The body-without-organs is the virtual dimension of the body, with all the potential 
connections, affects and movements. In order to reconstruct the physical body in this 
way we are encouraged to abstract relations of movement and rest, speed and 
slowness and emission of particles from the body. Abstraction here is not supposed to 
be the work of reason but, instead, to indicate a material process. And this is the point 
of contention. While becoming-woman may focus critical attention on the historical 
and socially structured quality of bodies, this move into abstraction could equally 
well be described as disembodiment, and disembodiment is arguably at odds with any 
productive and beneficial social critique of invested desire. It certainly seems a long 
way from feminist phenomenology. (2008 85)
4
 
 
What the abstract concept of becoming-woman lacks is any reference to ‘the historical and 
epistemological specificity of the female feminist standpoint’ (2008 85), and therefore any 
means to take on a fine-grained critical function. This is crucial: Howie is arguing that 
deployments of abstractions can never serve a critical function, presumably because 
abstractions fail to locate and delimit the particular, situated bases of a concept (and this is 
something all critique – according to Howie – must be capable of). For Howie in 2008, there 
is only ever a critique of abstraction, never critique with abstraction.
5
 
 Howie thus concludes with a wholesale rejection of becoming-woman as a conceptual 
tool for feminist theory, and this rejection is founded directly on an interpretation of 
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abstractions as obstacles to good feminist theory. To abstract is to efface the contextual 
peculiarities and textured singularities of the unique particular. To abstract is to withdraw 
from the standpoint that matters – the embodied, concrete vision of the subject (whether 
individual or communal). This is of course a pervasive theoretical position, valuing the 
concrete over the general. In what follows, however, I want to show how, within a broadly 
Marxist perspective, abstraction can become a theoretically-productive category. 
 
 
The Ambiguity of Abstraction in Between Feminism and Materialism 
Howie’s attitude to abstraction a few years later in Between Feminism and Materialism 
shares much with this critique of Deleuze, and yet it has in the meantime been enriched by a 
realisation of the importance of the Marxist notion of real abstraction. The following key 
passage from Between Feminism and Materialism makes the evolution of her views on the 
subject clear: 
 
Because we suffer through the machinations of the universalising mechanism of 
exchange, it is quite reasonable to be suspicious, even reject, reason and universals. It 
may or may not be the case that social criticism needs to begin in exaggeration, but 
hyperbole speaks to this anxiety in a rather unhelpful way. Despite the dangers of 
abstraction, it is only through a process of cognitive abstraction that the particular can 
be revealed within its relations. This is not to ape an epistemological view-from-
nowhere but to begin from a particular place and then to uncover social relations of 
construction, organisation and distribution. (2010 83) 
 
In other words, abstraction cannot be avoided. Thus, in addition to a continual insistence on 
abstraction as ‘erroneous’ (2010 6), ‘ideological’ (6) and a ‘falsification’ (67), there is now a 
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counter-emphasis, no matter how begrudging, on abstraction as a necessary and productive 
component of dialectical materialist method. That is, Howie is now far more ambivalent 
towards the idea of theoretical abstraction – and this, I want to show, is owing to a newly 
acquired appreciation for the mechanics of the labour theory of value as the ultimate criterion 
for evaluating theory.  
 Much of the early work in Between Feminism and Materialism is spent setting out the 
theory of value and demonstrating its significance not only for theory in general, but for 
feminism in particular.
6
 Indeed, Howie claims that ‘the vocabulary of critical theory’ has lost 
much of its meaning and value because of the tendency to ‘obfuscat[e] the centrality of the 
theory of value.’ (2010 13) For our purposes, what is central is Howie’s account of the 
emergence of abstraction – as real abstraction – out of the process of valuation. She 
concludes at the end of her exposition of the theory of value, 
 
We have now encountered abstraction in three main places. First, exchange value – 
the socially necessary time taken to produce a commodity – is an abstraction from 
particular productive endeavours. In exchange value, concrete labour presents itself 
as abstract labour. Second, exchange-value – through its abstraction of labour – 
places qualitatively distinct commodities in a ratio. By abstracting from use-value we 
can compare and exchange different goods… Third, we encountered abstraction in 
the wage-form. Obviously, workers receive wages in the form of money. This 
mediation helps to disguise the fact that the value of labour is equivalent to that 
consumed by the worker and his/her family, but this, too, is an abstraction. (2010 20) 
 
Valuation abstracts, universalises and identifies, giving rise to a thinking oriented around the 
categories of identity, universality and abstraction. Hence, ‘Abstraction, quantification and 
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standardisation – the hallmarks of a particular cognitive orientation integral to commodity 
production – are now detected in philosophy, language and scientific practice.’ (2010 72) 
This is the birth, for Howie following Adorno and Horkheimer, of instrumental reason: 
‘Subjects are compelled to behave as detached observers rather than active participants in life 
and… the demand to calculate oneself and others for profit leads to an attempt to regard the 
world from a purely rational and emotionless stance – a view-from-nowhere.’ (2010 47) 
 We can now see writ large in this narrative of the origins of abstraction much of the 
theoretical justification for Howie’s hostility to the concept both in ‘Becoming-Woman’ and 
in Between Feminism and Materialism itself. Yet, we can still glimpse something like 
abstraction’s necessity as well. This becomes particularly clear in Howie’s discussion of her 
own use of theoretical abstractions in the book. In a surprising passage that qualifies 
somewhat her earlier critique of Deleuze, she invokes the Deleuzian plane of immanence 
positively as a conceptual abstraction that is in fact helpful to the thinking of feminist theory: 
 
I suggest that we think about feminist theory in terms of a plane, similar to that 
expressed by Deleuze and Guattari as a plane of immanence: an intellectual heuristic 
through which we can create critical distance to pursue and reflect upon the problems 
of sexual difference, hierarchies and related imaginaries…. We approach this plane 
tentatively. As an abstraction it risks folding reification back in on itself… [It is] only 
one explanatory model amongst many and it should be considered alongside other 
models. Different contexts may call upon different explanatory models. (2010 58-9) 
 
Abstractions are to be employed, but only tentatively, with a great deal of suspicion. There is 
no absolute or a priori justification for the use of a theoretical abstraction; rather, they are to 
be deployed strategically, according to local conditions and contexts. Howie is here 
advocating a form of metaphilosophical pragmatism with respect to abstractions: they are to 
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be legitimated on account of their in situ productivity. It is what they do that counts. As 
Howie puts it more generally, ‘Every philosophy is practical, even when it seems at its most 
contemplative: its method a social and political weapon.’ (2010 9) 
 This move to localise and contextualise concepts on Howie’s part should now be 
familiar. It is her default critical tool: critique consists in the localisation of the particular and 
historically-specific practices on which abstractions depend. However, new to Between 
Feminism and Materialism is an acknowledgement that this critical process of specification 
and historicisation (i.e. the creation of ‘critical distance’) is itself dependent on abstractions. 
Abstraction is a condition of the possibility of critique, even when critique functions as the 
critique of abstraction. Such critique with abstractions, then, delimits the possible domain of 
effectiveness of an abstraction. In other words, it is the abstract production of critical histories 
of local abstractions – identifying the various extra-conceptual trajectories of conceptual 
identities. The critical question par excellence is thus for Howie: which abstraction and 
where? In the final section of this essay, I will turn to the significance of this form of critique 
for philosophy of religion. 
 
 
Real Abstraction in Contemporary Theory 
In Between Feminism and Materialism, Howie thus recovers a productive conception of 
abstraction which tempers her earlier attack on Deleuzian conceptual abstraction. In this 
section, I now argue that such a recovery is mirrored in more general trends in contemporary 
Marxist theory. The concept of real abstraction has recently returned to the forefront of 
Marxist analyses of the structures of capitalism. 
 While this recovery has its roots in the work of Virno (2004) as well as Žižek’s 
critique of Althusser (1989), its classic English-language articulation is to be found in Peter 
10 
 
Osborne’s 2004 ‘The Reproach of Abstraction’. Osborne here launches a polemic against the 
implicit – if often lazily-held – theoretical presupposition that abstraction is constitutively 
inadequate. The presupposition (i.e. the reproach of abstraction) runs, in Osborne’s own 
words, ‘there is some inadequacy inherent to abstraction per se, which is both cognitive and 
practical (ethico-political) in character.’ (2004 21) The abstract, it is assumed, is something 
that a theorist should be ashamed of:  
 
There is a paradoxical position, more or less explicit in a great deal of contemporary 
theory, which holds that, not merely despite but precisely because of the necessity of 
abstraction to thought… there is something both cognitively and politically 
inadequate about knowledge itself: not only existing knowledge, but all possible 
knowledge. (2004 21) 
 
Osborne identifies the prevalence of this ‘reproach of abstraction’ in the self-evidence of an 
anti-philosophical impulse manifest in contemporary theory’s reverence for singularities – an 
impulse that is heir to Humean empiricism and ultimately medieval nominalism. And, in 
opposition to this trend, pitting Marx against nominalism, empiricism and theories of the 
singular, he invokes the ‘paradoxical concreteness’ (2004 24) of abstractions within 
capitalism, calling thereby for a new incorporation of abstraction into theory that takes this 
concrete reality of the abstract seriously: 
 
A certain pervasive political discourse requires a new conception of the relationship 
between emancipation and actual abstraction – some conception of appropriation 
within abstraction… What new possibilities of the human are produced by the 
mediating force of actual abstractions? (2004 27) 
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Some sense of what this new discourse would look like is provided by Toscano’s 
recent explorations (2008a, 2008b) of the theory of real abstraction. Recovering the insights 
of Sohn-Rethel (1978), Toscano demonstrates how radically Marx’s doctrine of real 
abstraction separates his thinking from the philosophical tradition. For Toscano, the task 
confronting contemporary Marxist theory is the construction of an ‘ontology of real 
abstraction’ (2008a 276) which must take seriously abstraction ‘as a force operative in the 
world’ (2008a 274). Paradigmatic of this incorporation of real abstraction into theory is 
Paci’s insistence, ‘The fundamental character of capitalism is revealed in the tendency to 
make abstract categories live as though they were concrete. Categories become subjects… 
The abstract, in capitalist society, functions concretely.’7 Abstraction here becomes 
conceptualised as a transindividual, historically material condition of the possibility of 
capitalist life.  
In particular, Toscano is interested in how ‘a truly materialist investigation into real 
abstraction comes to unsettle our very image of thought’ (2008a 280) and, additionally, how 
this gives rise to the aforementioned break between Marxist and traditional accounts of 
abstraction within philosophy. As Toscano (citing Sohn-Rethel) claims, ‘Abstraction 
precedes thought… Marx’s discovery stands in irreconcilable contradiction to the entire 
tradition of theoretical philosophy.’ (2008a 281)8 From the point of view of real abstraction, 
not only are abstractions divorced from any epistemic procedure or from ideational status, 
they condition thinking. Hence, to quote Toscano once more, ‘Under the conditions of 
capitalism, thought is, in the final analysis, external to thought’ (2008a 284), or as Žižek has 
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put it, real abstraction ‘introduces a third element which subverts the very field of this 
distinction: the form of the thought previous and external to the thought – in short: the 
symbolic object.’ (1989 19)9 Abstractions must be taken theoretically seriously as 
constitutive and generative, but crucially what is at stake is that such constitution and 
generation result from the anomalous status of abstractions as the material of thinking that 
subsists external to it – as thought without thought. 
 
 
Histories of Religious Technology 
Abstractions have real powers and real effects; these powers and effects are not necessarily 
epistemic in nature, but exist as thought ‘prior’ and ‘external’ to all thought. Religions take 
their place among these abstractions, and therefore, like all such abstractions, they must – in 
the name of critique – be subject to an extra-conceptual history, a history famously proposed 
by Marx in the following footnote to Capital: 
 
A critical history of technology would show how little any of the inventions of the 
eighteenth century are the work of a single individual. As yet such a book does not 
exist. Darwin had directed attention to the history of natural technology, i.e. the 
formation of the organs of plants and animals which serve as the instruments for 
sustaining their life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man in society, 
of organs that are the material basis of every particular organisation of society, 
deserve equal attention?... Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, 
the direct process of the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the 
process of the production of the social relations of his life, and of the mental 
conceptions that flow from these relations. Even a history of religion that is written in 
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abstraction from this material basis is uncritical. It is, in reality, much easier to 
discover by analysis the earthly kernel of the misty creations of religion than to do the 
opposite, i.e. to develop from the actual, given relations of life the forms in which 
these have been apotheosized. The latter method is the only materialist, and therefore 
the only scientific one. The weaknesses of the abstract materialism of natural science, 
a materialism which excludes the historical process, are immediately evident from the 
abstract and ideological conceptions expressed by its spokesmen whenever they 
venture beyond the bounds of their own speciality. (2003 494-5) 
 
The task for a critical philosophy of religion is therefore a history of the constitution of 
religion in ‘the actions of man’, in ‘the direct process of the production of his life’, in ‘the 
process of the production of the social relations of his life’ and only ultimately in ‘the mental 
conception that flows from these relations’. A history of the technē of religion prior and 
external to religious thought is, according to Marx in this passage, the genuinely dialectical 
materialist approach. As Toscano puts it in his landmark essay on Marx’s critique of the 
critique of religion, ‘In order to tackle the endurance of religious abstractions we are to 
confront the social logic into which they are inscribed, and the dependence of these 
abstractions on given modes of production and social intercourse.’ (2010 9) This 
confrontation involves localising religion and tracing its efficacy – its real effects and real 
powers.
10
 Religion for the mature Marx is constitutive (just as it is for the Spinoza of the 
Theologico-Political Treatise; moreover, just as for the Spinoza of the Theologico-Political 
Treatise, the means of evaluating this constitution is through critical history).
11
 
 As we have seen, it is precisely such a mode of critique that Howie advocates for 
feminist philosophy and, I contend, it can serve as method for feminist philosophy of religion 
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too. One must cast a sceptical eye over abstractions by incessantly localising and 
contextualising them in their social history. Again, what results for feminist philosophy of 
religion is a history of religious abstractions prior and external to their thinking, or more 
specifically, a history of religious oppressions prior and external to religious 
conceptualisation.
12
 
 To end with a briefly sketched example: this externalising approach to belief can 
suggest reasons for the inefficacy and even redundancy of the new atheist critique and even 
of vast swathes of philosophy of religion. In short, the form of critique employed here is 
misguided. Thus, Toscano contends that a Marxist form of critique as the identification of 
forms of thought external to thought presents a challenge to the contemporary resurgence of a 
naïve strain of Enlightenment critique of religion as caricatured in the new atheist movement. 
He writes,  
 
It would be difficult to underestimate the relevance of this gesture today, when we are 
confronted with anti-religious arguments which, whatever the sincerity or nobility of 
their motivations, often rely on the idealist, asocial view that the sway of religious 
representations and ideologies over human affairs can be terminated by a mere 
change of consciousness. (2010 10) 
 
New atheism takes religion on its own terms by attempting to refute it on epistemic grounds. 
What is at stake is the truth or falsity of religions, irrespective of the fact that even the false 
has real powers and real effects. From the perspective developed in this paper, the fact that 
this critique neglects the extra-conceptual status of religious abstractions (i.e. the real powers 
and real effects of the false) ensures that it can never be effective. Moreover, it seems evident 
that Toscano’s criticisms can be further extended to cover almost the whole contemporary 
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practice of philosophy of religion itself. Philosophers of religion argue incessantly over the 
epistemic grounds and epistemic content of religion. The Marxist and feminist ideal of 
providing histories of religions as real abstractions provides a provocation to this orthodoxy, 
a genuinely materialist alternative in which religion is not merely reduced to a thought, but 
becomes a thought prior and external to thought. This is a challenge to both the universalising 
and ahistoricising tendencies of contemporary philosophy of religion – the challenge to 
conceive religion as real abstraction. 
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